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Victims and survivors from Cyangugu, Rwanda: the politics of testimony after genocide 
Rachel Ibreck 
‘When I went back, I discovered that my home was not there anymore. It was totally 
destroyed. I was the only Tutsi who had not died; there were hardly any left in the 
whole sector or commune. I felt isolated. I also felt afraid that I too would be killed.’ 
Claude, a Tutsi from Cyangugu, Rwanda, 1994.1 
‘I asked them why they had come to see me. They said: ‘because we know you 
collaborate with the Tutsis. But this time you have to show your commitment and 
help to kill the Tutsis.’ I told them: ‘firstly, I am not prepared to kill anyone. 
Secondly there should be an investigation to establish the truth about what has 
happened. And then whoever is responsible, Tutsi or Hutu or someone else, should be 
punished by the law.’ Félicien, a Hutu from Cyangugu, Rwanda, 1994.2  
Victim testimony is foundational to the pursuit of justice and social repair after mass atrocities and 
should be recognised as an expression of courage and transformative political agency. After the 1994 
genocide in Rwanda, survivors recounted horrors that could hardly be communicated, creating 
precious records of human suffering and loss. Since then, other victims of injustice and abuse have 
also given testimony to human rights organisations, despite fears of repression. Taken on their own 
terms, these harrowing individual testimonies are profound critiques of atrocities and political 
violence. Collectively, they form a powerful legacy and a counterpoint to narrow political framings of 
Rwanda’s history.  
The massacre of close to a million people in Rwanda between 6 April and 17 July 1994 is officially 
remembered as the ‘genocide against the Tutsi’. This accurately describes the intent of the genocide 
and the identities of most of the victims (Prunier, 1998; Des Forges, 1999). In the words of one 
survivor: ‘People were executed every day throughout four months… because they were Tutsi’ 
(Rurangwa, 2009, p.13-14). While scholars continue to debate questions of how and why, there is a 
consensus on the basic facts of the genocide: ‘Hutu leaders planned the violence… and deliberately 
attempted to eliminate a racially defined minority’ (Straus, 2006, p. 33). Still, the identification and 
categorization of victims has been complicated by fluid identities and intricate social relations at the 
micro-level, that produced ‘ambiguity and contradiction’ (Fujii, 2009, p. 8). Some Hutus were 
targeted during the genocide for their principles and actions, in interpersonal violence or criminality, 
or were inadvertently killed, and some were killed in the war; there were ‘multiple vectors of violence 
occurring at the same time’ (ibid, p. 81). Additionally, the defeat of the genocidal state did not equate 
to the end of political violence, as the post-genocide Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) regime stands 
accused of political violence, including human rights abuses, war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
either within Rwanda or in neighbouring Congo (Prunier, 2009, pp. 15-23; Reyntjens, 2015, pp. 25-
28).  
After the genocide, the RPF government embarked upon an expansive state-led programme to 
promote the memory of the genocide and bring the perpetrators to justice. This endeavour duly 
recognised the scale and intensity of the atrocities and the importance of ending impunity and 
ensuring accountability for genocide crimes against Tutsis, including murder, torture, rape and 
looting. It also adopted and extended some of the early initiatives by survivors to create memorials for 
the victims (Ibreck, 2010, p. 334-5), and provided spaces and times to acknowledge their grief and 
trauma in the public sphere. But these official mechanisms for genocide prosecutions and 
commemorations side-lined or suppressed complex and plural experiences of the genocide and its 
aftermath (Burnet, 2009).  
In many ways, the RPF has managed to harness the genocide to political objectives with ‘deft 
authoritarianism’ (Straus and Waldorf, 2011, p. 4) while repressing both Hutu and Tutsi opponents or 
critics.3 State-led processes have focused upon a ‘collective Tutsi victimization’ and thus tended to 
licence a broad definition of the perpetrators, ‘impos[ing] collective guilt on Hutus.’ (Waldorf, 2011, 
p. 49). In the dominant narrative of the genocide Tutsis are the primary victims, a few ‘Hutu 
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moderates’ are acknowledged, and the RPF emerges untarnished, as the party that ended the atrocities 
(Pottier, 2002). In consequence, much less is known about the victims of Rwandese Patriotic Army 
(RPA) abuses during the 1990-94 civil war or of political violence since 1994; they have been largely 
excluded from justice and do not figure in the public memory (Lemarchand, 2009, p.104).4  
Since 1994, the RPF and some its political opponents have engaged in a competitive politics of 
victimhood, undermining relationships between Tutsi genocide survivors and victims of political 
violence and the recognition of what they have in common. The RPF account of the genocide has 
marginalised Hutus victims, while some political elites in exile have employed claims of Hutu 
victimhood to minimise the evidence of genocide (COSAR 2000; FDLR 2004). Both have 
discursively positioned Tutsi and Hutu victims – or victims of genocide, and victims of war and post-
genocide abuses – in a symbolic opposition. This elite politics of victimhood compounds, and is also 
sustained by, actual divisions between victims of genocide, war and human rights abuses that were 
wrought in violence and reproduced in the mechanisms and practices of genocide justice.5 Even 
genocide survivors’ associations are plagued by internal tensions and have faced pressure from the 
government, limiting their critical potential (Rombouts, 2004, pp 281-320). The genocide severed 
communities and destroyed social relations; it produced categorical differences, hardening ethnicities 
and limiting the potential for Rwandan victims to form a unified or inclusive group, or act 
collectively. Post-genocide politics has reinforced these divisions.  
However, commonalities can be found in the testimonies of survivors and victims from a single 
locality despite the unique atrocity of the genocide and the heterogeneity in experiences of political 
violence.  This chapter explores the power of testimonies to disturb politicized accounts of history and 
victimhood.  Firstly, it brings together diverse testimony from genocide survivors and victims of 
political violence in the former prefecture of Cyangugu in south-west Rwanda, situating these in their 
historical context and showing how they enrich our understanding of the genocide and post-genocide 
period. This demonstrates that both victim testimony and ongoing human rights documentation are 
important resources to undermine accounts that minimise the experiences of genocide survivors by 
means of ‘moral equivalency,’6 or marginalise the suffering of other victims of political violence.  
Secondly, the chapter looks beyond the historical value of testimony to consider its political 
significance. Courts, human rights advocates and scholars have routinely employed survivor 
testimony as a source of information, woven into their own interpretations of events, yet it is also 
worth reflecting on their distinctive value as intrinsic critiques of political violence. My analysis 
foregrounds victim testimony as an act of agency and resistance to violence. Testimony contains 
complexities that are obscured in static and singular definitions of victimhood; it troubles neat 
categories, and reveals a tortuous and pervasive ‘continuum of violence’ (Richards, 2005). When 
abstracted from political framings, individual testimonies might contribute to the production of a 
‘critical memory’ in the interests of peace and justice (Lemarchand, 2009, p.108).  
Approach 
Individual testimonies and life histories can help to answer the most difficult questions about the 
genocide in Rwanda. Micro-level studies that draw on local and personal accounts have uncovered 
some of the intricacies of local social relations and identities (Fujii, 2009; Hintjens, 2008); the specific 
influences and circumstances that shaped participation (Hatzfeld, 2005) and resistance (Palmer, 
2014). They have also traced the varied threats and dilemmas that people endured in struggles for 
survival (Pottier, 2005).  This approach encourages an appreciation of nuances and complexities that 
are obscured in political discourses (Pottier, 2005); it offers us precision and circumspection so we 
can ‘see more inclusively…  and recognize that a story can never be fully recovered’ (Eisenstein, 
2004: 43). 
The methodological value of engaging with testimony is reinforced by an ethical rationale: after 
atrocities, there is a need to create spaces for victims to voice their own experiences (hooks, cited in 
McEvoy and Macconachie, p.498). Speaking for victims and ‘imposing a coherent narrative’ 
(Chakaravarti 2013, p.22) risks reinforcing their disempowerment. In consequence, the chapter begins 
with the presentation of a selection of testimonies from the archives of the human rights organisation, 
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African Rights,7 situated in the context of one locality: the former préfecture of Cyangugu. Initially, 
this illustrates the value of testimony as a source for the writing of critical histories. But it also 
provides a basis upon which to further explore the political significance of testimony in the second 
part of the chapter. The discussion draws on interviews gathered during PhD field research in Rwanda 
(2006-7), while also relying on documentary sources and comparative studies of testimony, trauma 
and victimhood. My analysis is also substantially informed by close reading of thousands of victim 
and survivor testimonies while involved in human rights research (1995-2003)8 and by the 
inspirational examples set by two Rwandan former colleagues, Pacifique Kabalisa and Félicien 
Bahizi, and the insights they have generously offered.9  
The history of genocide in Cyangugu 
In many ways, Cyangugu is an illustrative case that exemplifies patterns of violence elsewhere in 
Rwanda. It was one of twelve former préfectures during the period of 1994-200510 and was home to 
Rwandans of different ethnicities. As elsewhere, this mixed population was caught up in and 
destroyed by the genocide. Tutsis were targeted in their homes and fled to churches and public 
buildings where many lost their lives in large-scale massacres. Tens of thousands were killed, local 
leaders organised attacks and many ordinary Rwandans participated in killings. Here as elsewhere, the 
genocide was ‘authorized and obligatory’ a form of ‘law’ (Straus, 2006 p.219; p.201). After the RPF 
victory in July, most of the Hutu residents fled into the neighbouring Congo (then Zaire) as refugees 
and some became victims of wars in Congo after 1996. The residents who survived, remained or 
returned were subject to the same set of national policies as other parts of the country. The post-
genocide regime employed violence in its endeavour to extend control over the rural and urban 
population (Straus and Waldorf, 2011), and the people of Cyangugu were among those affected. 
There are also some distinctive features of Cyangugu’s history that are worthy of note. The place and 
its people have long been among the country’s most neglected and marginalised. In part this is a 
consequence of a location that is geographically distant from the central state, behind a dense forest at 
the border with the Congo. This physical separation has shaped a popular perception of its people as 
somehow different: ‘not real Rwandans’.11 It may also help to explain the strength of opposition 
politics here – Cyangugu was home to the leader of the largest opposition party before the genocide, 
the Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR), Faustin Twagiramungu.12 Similarly, it relates to 
the unique aspects of Cyangugu’s experience of the 1990-94 civil war and genocide period. The 
préfecture was the last region to come under RPF control and as such it escaped the effects of the civil 
war. It became the final outpost of the Interim Government before its members fled into exile in Zaire 
in July 1994. And from 23 June to 21 August 1994, it was also under the control of the French forces 
involved in Opération Turquoise. Lastly, a focus on Cyangugu is instructive because it occupies a 
special place in the historical record thanks to Catharine Newbury (1988) whose study of ‘political 
oppression’ in Kinyaga (the former Cyangugu) traced the political structures and processes that led to 
the Hutu revolution of 1959 back to the nineteenth century, exposing the deep roots of political 
violence in Rwanda.  
 
The roots of genocide: oppression and marginalisation  
 
Kinyaga (Cyangugu) was a ‘frontier region’, distant from the central state of the Kingdom of Rwanda 
until the reign of King Rwabugiri (1860-95) who established court there while launching military 
campaigns into the Congo. At that time, the population was heterogeneous and divided by clan and 
kinship identities. Later, people came to be increasingly defined by their relationships to the Rwandan 
court and by ethnic labels: ‘Tuutsi and Hutu… came to assume a political importance, determining a 
person’s life chances and relations with the authorities (Newbury, 1988, p.52). In this increasing 
social stratification, regional identities also mattered as new arrivals considered themselves superior to 
the locals, viewing all Kinyagans, including their fellow Tutsi, ‘with scorn’ (Newbury, 1988, p.50).  
 
Since the nineteenth century, Kinyaga, with its strategic location and fertile hills, has been subject to 
repeated violent interventions, including successive invasions from external tyrants and colonial 
forces. In 1898, German authorities established a military post in the area, and it became the first 
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region to experience colonial occupation. With the takeover and establishment of a Belgian 
administration after 1917, the region, once fragmented into chiefdoms and two small kingdoms, was 
centralised as a unified administrative unit. But when Kinyagan chiefs made a bid for local autonomy 
from the central court authorities, they were swiftly crushed, and the region saw increasing ‘tightening 
of control from above’ by the Belgian colonial state and its Rwandan Tutsi administrators. Kinyagans 
endured an array of colonial impositions and extractions (Newbury, 1988, p.132-47), while the 
territory was also exploited as a labour pool by European authorities across the border in Kivu, 
Congo.  
The intense, abusive mode of indirect rule pursued by Tutsi chiefs, backed by the colonial state, 
shaped political consciousness in the region, as it did nationally. These were the grounds upon which 
the ethnic chauvinism of the 1959 Hutu revolution, and the ensuing post-independence order were 
built. As a result, despite the relatively large Tutsi population in parts of Kinyaga at independence, 
representatives of the new Hutu revolutionary parties swept to power in communal elections in 1960 
(Newbury, 1988, p.200), presaging the establishment of a new political order privileging Hutu 
identity. 
In the post-independence period, discrimination and violence against Tutsis was licenced nationally 
while regional inequalities were also entrenched, marginalising all the people of Cyangugu. The 
budget for the prefecture was proportionally half of that allocated to the three favoured regions of 
Gisenyi, Kigali and Ruhengeri from 1978-90, while the policy of ‘ethnic and regional balancing’ was 
unfair to Tutsis and Hutus from Cyangugu, reducing their access to secondary school places 
(Byanafashe and Rutayisire, 2011, pp 460-462).13 These disparities fuelled grievances and ethnic 
tensions at the local level.  
In the same period, Cyangugu was affected by eruptions of political violence at moments of crisis for 
the post-independence Hutu-led regime. In 1963, there were attacks upon Tutsis in retaliation for 
‘Inyenzi’ raids, launched by Tutsi political exiles forced out by the 1959 purges. In October 1993, 
when Burundian Hutu President Melchoir Ndadaye was killed by Tutsi officers, civilians in 
Cyangugu were again targeted, leading to an estimated 40 deaths (Des Forges, 1999, p.181).  In 
February 1994, when Martin Bucyana, the CDR president was killed, Tutsi homes were burned.  
Accounts of genocide 
The killings in Cyangugu began on 7 April, the day after former President Habyarimana was 
assassinated (African Rights, 1995: 456-7).  Within three months, the majority of Tutsis in Cyangugu 
were dead – estimates indicate that in total more than 100,000 people were killed (ICTR, 2004).14 Our 
knowledge of how individuals experienced the genocide in Cyangugu is largely based on various 
forms of testimony from survivors, witnesses and perpetrators, given in human rights reports, ICTR 
judgements, news reports and interviews. One of the earliest published sources is a human rights 
report from African Rights (1995) which quotes testimony taken from witnesses and survivors 
between February and April 1995 at length and verbatim. Human Rights Watch also discusses 
massacres in Shangi, Nyamasheke and Mibilizi (see Des Forges, 1999, p.301), and provides a detailed 
description of the torture and killing of a Hutu resident of Cyangugu who rejected the politics of the 
MRND-CDR and was ‘killed by having parts of his body cut off, beginning with his extremities.’ (des 
Forges, 1999, 308).  
Existing reports have established beyond doubt that large-scale massacres occurred alongside 
individual targeting of Tutsis and Hutus. They revealed brutal killings, torture, rape, and looting. 
Similarly, ICTR judgements confirmed that tens of thousands of Tutsis were killed in large-scale 
massacres in Nyamasheke, Mibilizi, Shangi and Hanika parishes, Kamarampaka stadium, 
Gashirabwoba football field and Karambo military camp, among other killing sites. The ‘Cyangugu 
trial’ concluded beyond doubt that these massacres and other killings ‘resulted in the deaths of 
massive numbers of mostly Tutsi victims’ (ICTR, 2004, p.166).  
Yet, compared to the scale of the atrocities, there is still much we do not know about how the 
genocide and its aftermath affected the people in Cyangugu. And existing publications are not critical 
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histories, but mostly either advocacy reports calling for urgent investigations; or legal judgements 
determining the criminal responsibility of individuals. Moreover, these existing sources differ in 
various respects, including sometimes on the question of who was responsible. The International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) brought charges against Yussuf Munyakazi, Siméon 
Nshamihigo, Samuel Imanishimwe, André Ntagerura and Emmanuel Bagambiki (the former préfet) 
on the basis of accusations that they had leading roles in the atrocities in Cyangugu. But while three of 
the accused were convicted on several counts, both Ntagerura and Bagambiki were acquitted, a 
judgement that led to protests and outrage in Cyangugu. None of the accusations of rape relevant to 
the ‘Cyangugu trial’ were included in the ICTR indictment. But Bagambiki was subsequently tried in 
Rwanda in absentia and convicted of rape as a form of genocide (HRW 2007).   
Plural accounts of the genocide have emerged in public hearings in the gacaca courts15 held between 
2002 and 2012 at community level, but these are as yet unpublished and their contribution to the 
historical record must be treated with caution. The trials led to thousands of new convictions and 
information about how some individuals died and where they were buried. But they also became a 
focus for threats, lies and manipulation. Some witnesses were killed, and especially in areas of 
Cyangugu where there were few survivors, there were others who felt ‘too afraid to testify’ (African 
Rights and Redress 2008, p. 9). Meanwhile the accused sought to use the confessions system to their 
advantage and to garner local support for their release, as one witness explained: ‘they band together 
to contradict our testimony’ (ibid, p. 42). The lessons of the rich literature on gacaca are bound to 
apply in in Cyangugu as elsewhere: the courts became an opportunity for ‘corruption, score-settling, 
vengeance, the search for profit, and power plays’ (Ingelaere 2016: 12); truth at gacaca was 
undermined by ‘bandwagoning, balancing, and local power struggles’ (Chakravarty 2016, p. 30).  
Another source of information about the genocide has emerged through an independent investigation 
launched by the Government of Rwanda into the ‘role of France in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda’. 
But here too we must be careful. The report raised a series of new allegations about the genocide in 
Cyangugu that had not surfaced in the early testimonies given to human rights or ICTR investigators, 
mostly from confessed perpetrators. The report accused French soldiers of Opération Turquoise of 
involvement in killing, rape and distribution of arms (Mucyo, 2008), and challenged previous 
accounts of how they saved lives at the Nyarushishi camp for displaced persons (Prunier, 1998, p. 
292). 
The various public accounts that exist of the genocide in Cyangugu all incorporate and rely upon 
survivor and victim testimony. They have also been shaped by instrumental political and legal goals, 
so that testimony is deployed as evidence in an argument, rather than recounted as a narrative for its 
own sake. In contrast, privately recounted, individual testimonies have intrinsic value, revealing 
precious personal truths about the events of the genocide and its aftermath in Cyangugu.  
Testimony from Cyangugu 
The following testimonies cover a span of over ten years from 1994-2005, and include both genocidal 
violence and of other forms of political violence. By placing them in a historical sequence, we can 
perceive the significance of the genocide as a cataclysm, while also observing a spectrum of 
violations since.  
Thaciana: Genocide in 1994 
Thaciana, a 43-year old woman16  described her flight to a local parish on 7 April and her move from 
there to the stadium, ‘forced’ by the authorities. Her testimony describes the events of April-May 
1994, including the selective abduction and killings of the refugees, and the heroism of two Hutu 
priests, Father Oscar Nkundayesu and Father Baudoin Busunyu, and a seminarian, Félicien Bahizi.  
The interahamwe and soldiers paid regular visits to the [Kamarampaka] stadium to take people 
out to be shot. The prefect [Emmanuel Bagambiki] came in person, accompanied by the 
 6 
interahamwe, and read out a list of names of those wanted for questioning. These people were 
taken away and never seen again. They were killed outside the stadium… The génocidaires began 
by targeting intellectuals, businessmen and those who were well off. The simple peasants were 
left till last. We heard about how they died from people who had escaped, who came to the 
hospital and told us.  In any case, a lot of them were shot. Those who were cut to pieces with 
machetes were usually those they had forced to dig their own graves so that they could throw 
them straight in afterwards.  
Assessing that the situation [in the stadium] was deteriorating further, Father Oscar took the 
decision to start an escape route to the Congo. First, he found a Hutu, called Ntawumenyumunsi, 
who lived near Lake Kivu. He made an agreement with this man that he would take refugees 
across the lake in exchange for some reward. The Hutu did as he had promised without asking the 
refugees for anything.  The second route [he] set up was with an ex-member of the interahamwe. 
This man was a well-known murderer who had killed so many Tutsis that he had decided that 
enough was enough and he didn’t want to be involved in any more killings… He accepted the 
deal at a rate of 30.000 francs per person… The third and last escape route was from the parish of 
Nkanka and Father Busunyu played a very important part in it.  
Three men: Father Oscar, Father Busunyu and Bahizi the trainee priest made extraordinary 
personal sacrifices to save our lives. They were all Hutus but they tried to save the lives of Tutsis. 
The survivors of Cyangugu will never forget that they owe their lives to these men. Father 
Busunyu’s father was a very well-known member of the interahamwe… if he had known what he 
was doing he could have killed him with his own hands… sadly he died in a refugee camp in 
Congo. Father Oscar is still alive but his mother and sister were killed.17 
Clothilde: Genocide and rape in 1994  
Clothilde, a 53-year old woman, and her husband were both traders before the genocide. She described 
the loss of her entire family during the genocide. Her full testimony also spoke of her current situation, 
as a rape survivor living with HIV/AIDS.  
I was a married mother of nine children, but they were all murdered, like their father, 
during the genocide. Right at the beginning of the genocide, we saw Hutus kill our 
Tutsi neighbours. As we were Tutsis, we sought refuge at the Catholic Parish of 
Nyamasheke… a huge attack was launched against the refugees in the church. During 
the chaos, a man I didn’t know took me by the arm, led me into the priests’ residence 
and raped me.  
The massacres began on a Thursday and continued until Friday. It was always the same 
group of interahamwe who were responsible, with help from local residents who were 
our neighbours. The Thursday that I was raped, I came back to the church after the 
rapist left. I spent the night at the altar and left the church on the Saturday, leaving the 
corpses of my children, other members of my family, neighbours, friends and 
acquaintances behind me. All my children lost their lives in that church, while their 
father was killed in Cyesha.18  
After I walked out of the parish, I headed for the home of a Hutu friend to ask him to 
hide me. I had a lot of injuries, caused by grenade splinters and blows from machetes. 
The family took care of me and cleaned my wounds every day. I lived there until the 
end of the genocide.19 
Jacqueline: Death after genocide in 1995  
Jacqueline, a young woman of 20, described her experiences during the genocide with her sister and 
brother-in-law, who was abducted and killed at the stadium in Kamembe. In her full testimony, she 
spoke of her their flight to Nyarushishi, where she said they ‘received protection from the French.’ 
After the genocide she and her sister returned to the family home and found all their family were dead 
and their home was destroyed. Soon afterwards, her sister died.  
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From April 1994, until the country was taken over, we were really living in misery. 
Before the genocide, my older sister had a very nice life. At Kamembe stadium we 
had nothing to eat, we also didn't have any medicines. It was the same in Nyarushishi. 
When she fell sick her body couldn’t fight the illness. After her death, I immediately 
wanted to commit suicide. She was the only one of my family who had escaped the 
genocide. I was the one who had to take care of the body. I had no money to buy the 
coffin; digging the grave was also difficult for me. The children were crying calling 
for their mother although she was dead. I had no-one to console me.  
 
In the burial of my older sister, I was overcome with sorrow… After the burial, the 
children cried a lot asking me if their mother really left too. Instead of replying I used 
to cry. I had become the mother of these children, the children were crying and asking 
for food, when I didn’t have anywhere to get it… The children asked me why they 
had all this suffering. I had nothing to reply to them, I also don’t understand why the 
Hutus killed the Tutsis. I used to see other children of the same age who used to walk 
with their parents and friends, but I and my children have no-one to say hello to us, 
all the people who used to know my family were dead.  
 
Jacqueline described her struggle to care for the children on her own and how one of them fell ill. By 
May 1995, he too was dead.20  
 
Fidèle: Killing of survivors in 1996  
A young man, Fidèle aged 20, explained that he and his Tutsi father were protected by friends during 
the genocide, while his Hutu mother ‘was not a target’. After the genocide, they returned home to 
Bugarama commune, and Fidèle’s father was appointed as local councillor. He spoke of the murder of 
his close friends, three genocide survivors who had lost their parents in the genocide and their Hutu 
domestic worker. Fidèle was at their home when they were visited by six men, armed with guns.  
The men encircled us, constantly fired questions at us, asking where is the councillor? 
They asked for his name and… I lied and pretended I did not know who he was. They 
told Spéciose, Hyacinthe, Pierre and Pie (a Hutu who was their servant) to lie on the 
floor and some of the attackers kept an eye on them.   
Fidèle was eventually released and immediately went to warn his parents. Together, they 
spent the night in the bush. But they heard gun shots and the following morning they found 
that their friends and their servant had been killed. 
I believe that the four were killed because they were accusing génocidaires and 
demanding the return of their property. In a way, they were embarrassing witnesses… 
We really wonder when the killers will stop plaguing our lives and butchering our 
loved ones.21  
Anaclet: Attacks on Tutsis in Zaire in 1996  
Anaclet, aged 26, lost 18 members of his close family in the genocide, including his parents, his 
brother, three sisters and all their husbands and children. He survived by fleeing across the border to 
Bukavu, Zaire, across the Rusizi river. After the genocide, he remained in Bukavu working as a cook. 
He explained: ‘I did not have the courage to return to Rwanda at the time because I knew very well 
that my family had been wiped out and I was well employed.’ But the situation soon deteriorated.  
The Rwandese refugees in the camps and elsewhere in Zaire began to stir up ill-
feeling. They verbally abused the Tutsis they met in Zaire and even wanted to kill 
them. Wherever we went we were threatened. In August 1996, the situation rapidly 
deteriorated and sparked off an armed confrontation between the FAR and the 
Banyamulenge rebels. The Zairean soldiers started disliking all the Tutsis, and the 
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Hutu Rwandese refugees targeted us for elimination. We had to bribe them to avoid 
being targeted… The district leaders collaborated with the militiamen, the Zairean 
soldiers and the ex-FAR to capture the Tutsis. I had given $5 to the leader of my 
district believing that he would leave me alone but I was mistaken. He arrested me 
himself and drove me to the roadblock in the district of Essence. I was kept at this 
roadblock all day and in the evening they began to beat me. I tried everything in my 
power to bribe them but in vain. I gave them packets of cigarettes that I had for 
selling and I gave them $50. I was the only captured Rwandese Tutsi at the 
roadblock, all the others were Zairean Tutsis…  
The soldiers got hold of me by the neck and took my remaining dollars which I had 
hidden in my shirt. They tied my hands behind my back and took me to the army 
prison… Throughout the journey to the detention centre, passers-by, men, women 
and children shouted insults and threw stones at me. They wanted to stone me to 
death. Before being thrown into the prison at Kije, I was badly tortured. The soldiers 
put nails in my left leg and beat me with a truncheon. The nails were small, about 
three or four centimetres long, but they were extremely painful. 
When I arrived at the prison I thought that I had arrived in hell – the heat was 
unbearable and I was almost naked. In the cell, I met lots of Zairean Tutsis who had 
arrived before me. We were 36 in all and there were six corpses in the cell, three of 
them were Tutsis and the other three were Zairean Hutus from Bashi who had been 
arrested because they looked like Tutsis. The cell was incredibly unhygienic with 
corpses, urine and faeces.22  
In October 1996, Banyamulenge rebels arrived in Bukavu and the prisoners managed to escape. 
Fidèle had survived and returned to Rwanda, but faced ‘extreme poverty’.  
Révélien: Accused of ‘genocide ideology’ in 2004 
Révélien, aged 57, described his arrest on the charge of genocide ideology in 2004. He spoke about his 
suspicions about why he was targeted, including his ‘family situation’ which he described as relatively 
wealthy, as well as his role in local politics. Additionally, he spoke of pressures related to his role as a 
judge in gacaca and of the recent murder of his brother by RPF soldiers. 
I am in prison charged with the crime of the ideology of genocide, an accusation that I 
reject in its entirety. I didn’t know that I would be treated like this after everything I 
did to save the Tutsis of my cellule during the genocide. Also, I regret the influence I 
used to persuade the population to vote in favour of the RPF. I believed that I was in 
the process of electing a political force that would combat injustice, a true democracy. 
But, I [now] realize that most officials at the local level don’t respect the orders of their 
superiors.  
I am accused of insulting Kagame by saying that he adopted a policy of stealing the 
fields of Hutus for the benefit of his cows and that because of this, the farmers who live 
along the lakes will die of famine while Kagame’s cows will grow fatter. I have never 
circulated such statements to the population… I am accused by a certain Mathias a 
survivor of the genocide. I am the one who helped him take refugee on the island of 
Idjwi… I know well that Mathias had sworn to make me suffer since I didn’t support 
his son’s candidacy for the post of councillor in our sector… he spread rumours saying 
that I had told people not to elect a Tutsi.  
I appeared before the district tribunal about six months ago. However, no verdict has 
yet been given… 
Another issue concerns the gacaca courts. I had been elected president of the gacaca 
jurisdiction in my sector. Since the beginning of audiences for gacaca in my region, I 
decided to give testimony about everything that I saw during the genocide. But there 
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are people who accuse me of having taken part in the massacres of Tutsis... The accused 
do everything possible to escape justice. They bribe Mathias and our councillor, Alfred, 
also a survivor.  
I can’t end without telling you that a certain Phocas, a survivor, became allies with my 
aggressors to support them in the coup they mounted against me. He had collaborated 
with RPF soldiers in the murder of my younger brother, Pascal, a trader. They took 
2,000,000 francs from him. His executioners were let out from jail; they were 
exonerated by the claim that my brother had raised money for the benefit of the 
FDLR.23  
Daniel: Fear and threats in 2005 
Daniel, aged 36, is a Hutu who married his Tutsi wife three years before the genocide, against the wishes 
of both their families. He spoke of family pressures and local political tensions and observed an irony 
that the same influential Hutu businessmen who used to ‘collaborate’ with the Hutu exiles in 1996/7 
are now the most ‘ardent supporters of the RPF’. He gave an account of his experiences and analysis of 
the genocide, then spoke of his present fears following a ‘false accusation’ at a gacaca trial.  
The genocide in our country met no obstacles because it was endorsed by the authorities 
who had the right to put an end to it. Senior military officers were, more than anyone 
else, the key drivers of the machine of extermination. Working closely with the leading 
interahamwe, they gave the example when it came to wiping out Tutsis. In Kamembe 
town, most of the first victims, educated people and businessmen, were shot by 
soldiers. Afterwards, and due to the encouragement of local officials, the population 
became involved in the genocide… acting out of fear. 
Since officials at all levels were committed to the plan to exterminate the Tutsis, it was 
difficult, almost impossible, to save a few. Since you could be killed for hiding a Tutsi, 
most people preferred not to take the risk. I was obliged to try and save my brothers-
in-law and my sisters-in-law. I’m very happy that I did so, despite the huge costs it 
entailed for me.    
But now I’m not at ease. Since they started to gather information for gacaca in the 
cellule where I lived during the genocide, I was surprised that one survivor accused me 
of trying to kill him. In order to give this crime more weight, he cited me in a group 
that included big businessmen who had distinguished themselves in the genocide. They 
are all living in exile.   
Just as there were racist Hutus who spilled the blood of innocent people during the 
genocide, it is possible that there are survivors who use gacaca in a manner that is 
fundamentally racist. It’s these people who consider all Hutus as génocidaires.     
I’m not surprised if people now want to classify me as an interahamwe. In the last 11 
years, my business has done very well. There are a lot of people who have it in for me 
and who would like to see me fail. The easiest route is to charge me with the crime of 
genocide. So, right now, I feel very precarious.24 
 
Revealing the complexities of genocide and political violence  
These testimonies from victims at different moments in Rwanda’s violent history begin to expand our 
understanding of the genocide and post-genocide political violence. They expose the unique horror 
and devastation of the genocide, but also reflect its consequences and the persistent insecurity 
associated that has followed. They do not contain demands for revenge or retribution, instead they are 
preoccupied by questions of memory and justice. They also implicitly raise some questions about the 
details of other written records, including the ICTR judgement and the Mucyo report.25  
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The people described in the testimonies do not fit neatly into categories identified in national accounts 
of the genocide. Survivors describe being targeted as Tutsis, but they also detail other lives lost, 
including those of Hutus. Genocide perpetrators tend to be named specifically, as individuals, as well 
as in generalised terms. We find Hutus who saved lives, including in one case, a former genocide 
perpetrator. We also learn of the persecution of some Hutus, in one case a genocide survivor was 
accused of involvement. All these details are reminders that the labels of victim and perpetrator are 
situational; neither are necessarily static categories (McEvoy and McConnachie, 2012).  
The testimonies also reveal the essence of atrocities in ways that reach beyond the facts of the events 
they describe. They express the trauma and incomprehension felt by survivors and victims and lack 
narrative coherence and interpretations that we find in other accounts of the genocide. All the 
accounts are spare and literal; they relate mainly events and observations, rather than attitudes and 
feelings; they include no embellishment. This is also in contrast with the general tenor of narrative 
discourse in Rwanda, that is often rich in proverbs, giving it an ‘exquisite subtlety’ and poetic quality 
(Newbury, 2011, p. xxxvi) as well as with official accounts of the genocide. The testimonies reflect a 
sense of shock and the difficulty of communicating or making meaning from atrocities and human 
rights abuses.  
Even the small collection of testimonies cited above help to enrich our understanding of the history of 
the period in Cyangugu, although it remains a selective, unfinished account. Each testimony is confined 
to agonizing moments in the lives of certain individuals. The collection is not representative of the 
varieties of survivors and victims, nor does it catalogue all the types of political violence that have been 
inflicted on the people of Cyangugu. Each survivor and victim had more to tell about the histories of 
violence in the area and some of the most prominent events and individuals do not feature in the above 
accounts. Survivors and victims were not aware of events nearby, nor of course could they predict 
experiences of violence that were to follow in their own lives of the lives of others after the testimony 
was taken.26 This is an argument for the expansion of the archive of testimonies, to include people 
affected in different ways by the genocide or by other tragedies, as suggested by a genocide survivor 
from Nyamasheke, Cyangugu:  
We need to try to make people think of a better future without massacres. As well as 
the victims of genocide there are also others who have problems: the refugees who 
came back from elsewhere. The consequences of the genocide are something which 
affects all the people of Rwanda. We need to think of all sides for all the Rwandese 
people, the genocide victims and perpetrators… People are left in misery. There are 
widows on all sides, and people whose husbands are in prison… All this society is sick, 
shocked, traumatised. So, the testimonies on the genocide should also be accompanied 
by testimonies from Congo victims.27 
 
Beyond victimhood: the ethics and politics of testimony  
Testifying to experiences of genocide and political violence entails a form of political agency. It may 
be the last resource that victims have left, and we know from reflections of Holocaust survivors that 
the process is simultaneously felt as painful and necessary. Survivors have described a ‘desperate urge 
to testify’ (Young, 1988, p.17) alongside a sense that it is impossible to communicate the depth of the 
atrocity; its ‘enormity and noncredibility’ (Levi, 2003 [1989], p.30). They have spoken of being 
‘possessed by the past’ (La Capra, 2001: 89) and of an impression that it is ever present, ‘etched in my 
memory’ (2003 [1990], p.46). Their testimonies are borne out of an impulse to question and transform 
prevailing accounts of history. They involve a struggle to overcome the limits of language in order to 
bear witness (Young, 1988, p.16) and disclose the truth.   
The revelations that emerge from such testimonies are in their essence condemnations of the 
violations and assertions of the dignity and humanity of those who suffered. As such they implicitly 
challenge the kind of politics that relies upon violence and war. The power of testimony is as a 
declaration of the trauma that was endured, almost regardless of its specificity about the violence; 
testimony consists in being true to the ‘value’ or meaning of facts, not simply their reality (Mesnard, 
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2014, para. 15). Accounts given by victims express a profound truth: the ‘social significance’ (ibid) of 
violence as the ‘breakage of a framework’ (Laub, 1992, cited in LaCapra, 2001, p.88).  
Certainly, testimony varies in its power to communicate the disturbing truth of the atrocities, just as 
victims differ and their situation changes. As events become historically distant, and politically-
authorized narratives of traumatic events are constructed and disseminated, we might expect testimonies 
to lose their unmediated quality (Schudson, 1995, p.315) and to be gradually folded into the social 
dynamics of memory that tinge the past with traces of the present (Misztal, 2003).  
Yet even after a period where memories may have faded or altered, the testimonies of people affected 
by atrocities and human rights abuses retain their importance for history and politics. Testimony enacts 
resistance to the original crime and calls for a recognition that the victims’ lives mattered. It is truthful 
– voicing ‘what the survivor believes is true’ – and ethical: ‘linked with an obligation to redress the 
injustice of political violence’. (Chakaravarti, 2013, p.24). By giving testimony, victims become 
survivors, displaying a form of agency and struggle; a determination to challenge the perpetrators. They 
voice their personal anguish: ‘in the hope that something good may come’ of it (Weine, 2006, p xiii).  
 
Conclusion 
The genocide was a ‘moral shock’28 which severed social relations, but through their testimony, 
victims have contributed to exposing the truths of victimhood during and after the events and to the 
eventual possibility of political transformation. These individual experiences require us to 
acknowledge the magnitude and horror of the violations committed during the genocide, but they also 
locate this atrocity within a gendered continuum of violence stretching from before, during and after 
the genocide, affecting people of various ethnicities, and crossing borders. Some people have been 
repeatedly subject to various forms of violence under different regimes.  
Observing the complex realities of violence up close, from a local perspective undermines the 
emphatic arguments of those who present monocausal explanations for participation such as ethnic 
hatreds or ethnic fears (Fujii, 2009). Instead we see that genocide is ‘messy’ and complicated (Fujii, 
2009: 8) and its effects are enduring. Testimonies show that the period from April to July 1994 was a 
unique atrocity, but it was neither the beginning, nor the end of political violence. Rwandans have 
endured persistent political and structural violence over generations. By tracing life histories in one 
locality we can begin to understand the trajectory of violence, rife with local complexities. They also 
remind us of the political value of testimony as an attempt to expose and gain recognition for the 
truth, a courageous act that originates in an appeal for change, rather than a narrow attempt to attain 
static ‘victimhood.’  
Survivor and victim testimonies from Cyangugu implicitly or explicitly denounce violent politics. 
They identify the specific and plural ways in which people experienced the genocide and its aftermath 
and provide a corrective to narrow categorizations of victim and perpetrator groups. The collection 
and preservation of diverse testimonies is essential after atrocities. Not only is it essential for justice, 
but it is a means to counteract an exclusionary politics of victimhood and convey the complex realities 
of unconscionable suffering. 
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1 Claude Kanamugire, a Tutsi survivor from Ninzi, Cyangugu, cited in African Rights (1995, p.456).  
2 Félicien Bahizi, a Hutu who helped to protect Tutsis in Nyamasheke, Cyangugu, and was threatened 
during the genocide, cited in African Rights (1995, p. 457).   
3 The regime has favoured Tutsis in political appointments but it has also killed and threatened Tutsis, 
including genocide survivors (Reyntjens, 2015; see also Longman, 2011, pp. 28-32). 
4 The government has acknowledged that some individual soldiers are responsible for abuses 
(Waldorf, 2011, p.50) but refutes charges that these were authorised by the RPA (see Peskin, 2005). 
Additionally, it has sought to dismiss accusations of massacres during the war in the neighbouring 
Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997 (Reyntjens, 2011, pp 135-36).   
5 See Chakravarty’s (2016) seminal study of gacaca courts. 
6 This apposite phrase is used by Waldorf (2011) firstly to refer to negationism by Hutu exiles 
promoting a claim that there was a double genocide, or an argument that the 1994 killings were a 
result of ‘war and self-defence’ (p.50); and secondly (p.81) to raise questions about the study of 
Davenport and Stam (2009). 
7 The testimonies were available to me in unedited versions and some of them have not been 
published previously. I worked at African Rights from 1996-2003. They form part of an archive 
includes over 300 testimonies related to the genocide in Cyangugu, and over 3000 testimonies in total 
(this estimate refers to original documents I have access to, not on the total numbers gathered by the 
organisation). African Rights publications have been cited as sources in numerous other works on the 
genocide (e.g. des Forges, 1999; Straus, 2006). I have used only first names for testimonies and 
initials for interviews for ethical reasons.  
8 This is a form of ‘engaged scholarship’ since as a human rights researcher the author was ‘actively 
involved in the world of its subject matter’ (MacKinnon 2010, p. 203). 
9 As human rights researchers from Cyangugu, Pacifique and Félicien have worked tirelessly to 
preserve the memory of genocide survivors and victims of human rights abuses, as well as honourable 
Rwandans who saved lives, including in their native préfecture. They were both targeted during the 
1994 genocide. As a Tutsi, Pacifique was forced to flee Cyangugu in 1994, while Félicien, who is 
Hutu, faced threats because of its efforts to save lives in Cyangugu during the genocide. Both were 
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also forced into exile due to threats after the genocide. Their insights have been invaluable in the 
research for this chapter during 2016-17, but all errors and omissions are my own. 
10 It was one of twelve préfectures during the period examined here. Local government administrative 
boundaries were redrawn in January 2006 as part of a decentralisation programme and Cyangugu was 
then included in Western province. 
11 PK and FB, personal communication, Brussels, November 2017. 
12 Twagiramungu became Prime Minister in the post-genocide Government of National Unity after 
the genocide, and was the sole opposing candidate against the incumbent President Paul Kagame in 
the 2003 elections. He has lived in exile since.  
13 My translation from the French.  
14 Straus (2006, p.55) estimates that the Tutsis population of Cyangugu was 9.6% of the overall 
number of Tutsis within Rwanda and that the percentage killed was 5.9%. But he points out that the 
figures are unreliable due to problems with census and survey data. Relatedly, his calculations suggest 
that the number of Tutsi in the region was some 70,000. The ICTR estimates must include both Tutsis 
and any Hutus who died in the killings. The assertion that the majority of Tutsis were killed is beyond 
dispute and also confirmed by individual testimony eg. Note 1.  
15 The gacaca courts were established to expedite genocide justice and to promote reconciliation 
through ‘truth-telling’. They draw on community and custom but are driven by the state and 
contemporary concerns and are both punitive and restorative. Ultimately the courts heard close to 2 
million cases and sentenced more than a million people on a range of crimes. 
16 The ages given refer to the age at the time the testimony was given.  
17 Testimony given in Cyangugu, 4 October 1999. Jacqueline’s full testimony also lists the names of 
some of the dead, and those who were saved.  
18 The place where the sous-préfecture office was located.  
19 Testimony given in Cyangugu, August 2003.  
20 Testimony given in Cyangugu, May 1996.  
21 Testimony given in Cyangugu, March 1996. 
22 Testimony given in Cyangugu, November 1996. 
23 Testimony given in Cyangugu, June 2005. Révélien’s full testimony also covered historical issues, 
including his arrest in 1986 on the grounds of ‘having defended a Tutsi’, and his role in saving lives 
during the genocide. The Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) is a militia group 
formed in 2000, largely composed Hutus based in the DRC and opposed to RPF rule in Rwanda and 
Tutsi influence in the region. Its leader Major General Sylvestre Mudacumura was deputy commander 
of the FAR Presidential Guard in Rwanda in 1994. 
24 Testimony given in Cyangugu, June 2005. 
25 For instance, Thaciana accuses former préfet Bagambiki directly, in contrast to the ICTR judgement 
of acquittal. Similarly, Jacqueline, who was at Nyarushishi, describes the French as protectors there, 
in contrast to the Mucyo report (2008). 
26 For instance, Father Busunyu, a priest who saved lives in Nyamasheke, named by Thaciana, was later 
killed in a massacre in the refugee camps in eastern DRC in 1997 (RwaBaho, 2015), while his 
compatriot Félicien Bahizi was persecuted by the RPF and forced into exile in 2009. 
27 JP, personal communication, Kigali, July 2006. This refers to Hutu refugees who were victims of 
massacres in the Congo war in 1996-7, (see Stearns and Borello, 2011). Also note victims and 
survivor groups have sometimes taken the lead in documenting violations and come together in 
associations and commemorations that explicitly include ‘all that were victimized by genocide and 
wars’ (Jambonews.net 2014). 
28 FB, personal communication, Kigali, July 2006.  
